Interesting post about IM

I just read interesting post about IM. A must read!

When will IM come of age?
Instant messaging (IM) has been a popular consumer tool for several years now but has yet to become accepted within the business world. Fear of misuse seems to be a key argument against adoption, with comments such as “people will just waste time chatting” being one of the common excuses. There are two key reasons why I believe organisations simply cannot ignore the potential of IM.

Read the rest at Joining Dost Blog

 

 

Test post from Office 2007 Beta 2

My first post from Microsoft Office 2007 Word Beta 2. I like it… 🙂

Backup EFS certificate

How do you backup EFS certificates?

I personally use this method from command line:

cipher.exe /x

Simple a? 🙂

And warning. Store this backup certificate to safe (also physical safe) place!!!

 

Configure 3DES Encryption for EFS

EFS (Encrypted File System) is a built in feature in Windows 2000, XP and 2003 that allows users to securely encrypt files and folders. But you can change encryption algorithm if needed.

By default EFS use the DESX algorithm for encryption in Windows 2000 and Windows XP. In Windows XP SP1 and Windows Server 2003 default encryption algorithm is Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) using 256-bit key. For users requiring greater symmetric key strength with a FIPS 140-1 compliant algorithm, the 3DES algorithm can be enabled in Windows XP and Windows Server 2003. This can be done via GPO or registry.

When enabling 3DES using Group Policy both IPSec and EFS will use the 3DES algorithm. If you change this in registry changes will aplay only to EFS. Find the following key:

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESOFTWAREMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionEFS

Create a new REG_DWORD named AlgorithmID and set the HEX value to 0x6603. After rebooting computer it will use 3DES instead of DESX or AES. Recommended and most secure algorithm is AES in this case. Stay away from 3DES or DESX. [:P]

Exchange 2003 Usefull links

Exchange 2003 Performance Tuning:

• Optimizing storage for Exchange 2003
• Concepts in disk sizing
• Details on Exchange 2003 SP2 Std Database Limit Size
• Exchange Server Stressand Performance tool
• JetStress
• Load Simulator
• Why Should you use Diskpar and Diskpart?
• Exchange Server 2003 Performance: 10 Things to Think About

 

Windows Vista Whitepapers and interesting articles

• Introduction to Network Access Protection
• Network Access Protection Architecture
• Internet Protocol Security Enforcement in the Network Access Protection Platform
• Cable Guy – Network Access Protection Platform Overview
• Network Access Protection: Frequently Asked Questions
• Windows Vista Security Enhancements

 

ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization) in Windows Vista Beta 2

Today I spent some time playing arround Windows Vista Beta 2. There is one interesting thing that i found out. It has ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization) and it is turned on by default. It is a great against defense against buffer overrrun exploits called address space layout randomization. This defense is of course not a replacement for insecure code but it is indeed a usefull in Mult-Llayered defense. So remote exploitation of overflows has just got a lot harder.

So what is ASLR?

Address space layout randomization (ASLR) is a computer security feature which involves arranging the positions of key data areas, usually including the base of the executable and position of libraries, heap, and stack, randomly in a process’ address space. This hinders some types of security attack by preventing an attacker being able to easily predict target addresses, for example attackers trying to execute return-to-libc attacks may find it harder to locate the code to be executed. Several security systems implement ASLR, notably OpenBSD and the PaX and Exec Shield patches for Linux.

ASLR relies on the low chance of an attacker guessing where randomly placed areas are located: the odds are 1 / 2b, where b is the number of bits of entropy used to determine the position of the data area. In many systems, 2b can be in the thousands or millions; on modern 64-bit systems, these numbers typically reach the millions at least. Some systems implement Library Load Order Randomization, a form of ASLR where the order in which libraries are loaded is randomised. This leaves libraries at unpredictable positions: the chances of an attacker correctly guessing the location of a library is 1 / n, where n is the number of libraries loaded.

 

After two years (almost…) ;-)

I changed engine and look of my blog… Hope you like it.